A Verified Protocol Buffer Compiler
The code responsible for serializing and deserializing untrusted external data is a vital component of any software that communicates with the outside world, as any bugs in these components represent a key attack vector for remote attackers. This situation is particularly acute for verified systems, where any defects in the parsing code can invalidate any formal proofs about the system. One way to reduce the trusted code base of these systems is to use interface generators like Protocol Buffer and ASN.1 to generate serializers and deserializers from data descriptors. Of course, these generators are not immune from bugs.
In this work, we formally verify a compiler for a realistic subset of the popular Protocol Buffer serialization format using the Coq proof assistant, proving once and for all the correctness of every generated serializer and deserializer. One of the challenges we had to overcome was the extreme flexibility of the Protocol Buffer format: the same source data can be encoded in an infinite number of ways, and the deserializer must faithfully recover the original source value from each. We have validated our verified system using the official conformance tests.
Tue 15 Jan
|14:00 - 14:30|
|14:30 - 15:00|
A Coq Mechanised Formal Semantics for Realistic SQL Queries - Formally Reconciling SQL and Bag Relational AlgebraDOI
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