Towards Secure Compilation of Power Side-Channel Countermeasures
Software countermeasures against power side-channel attacks are an active research area in cryptography and cryptanalysis. To date, no compiler provides dependable compilation from high-level languages since respective security properties are systematically broken at compile time. There is a strong demand for secure compilation as it is a difficult and error prone task to implement, adopt and verify handwritten assembly for each targeted platform. We provide a characterization of the probing security policy for power side-channel countermeasures, related preservation problems and sketch an approach for future work to close the gap between abstract algorithms and their secure implementation or compilation to relevant architectures.
Sun 13 Jan
|09:00 - 10:00|
Benjamin GregoireINRIAFile Attached
|10:00 - 10:30|
Marc GourjonHamburg University of Technology and NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbHFile Attached